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DOUBLE DAMAGES OR NOTHING: 
WHETHER MEDICARE ADVANTAGE 
ORGANIZATIONS HAVE A PRIVATE CAUSE 
OF ACTION UNDER THE MEDICARE 
SECONDARY PAYER ACT 
JENNIFER A. PREVETE† 
INTRODUCTION 
Mrs. Aidan is a sixty-seven-year-old woman who suffers from 
Type 2 diabetes.1  She took the drug Avandia, manufactured and 
distributed by the company GlaxoSmithKline, L.L.C. (“GSK”), for 
a year before suffering a stroke related to its consumption.  She 
amassed substantial medical costs during her hospitalization and 
treatment.  Under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act (“MSP 
Act”), GSK is responsible as a primary payer to cover the cost of 
Mrs. Aidan’s medical treatment.2 
Assume Mrs. Aidan is a Medicare enrollee.  Under the MSP 
Act, if GSK fails to make its required payments for Mrs. Aidan, 
the government may cover her medical expenses by making a 
conditional payment.3  As the term “conditional” connotes, 
Medicare pays with the stipulation that GSK, the responsible 
primary payer, will reimburse Medicare.4  If GSK does not repay 
the government within sixty days of Medicare’s final demand, the 
MSP Act empowers the government to bring an action in federal 
court and to recover not only the conditional payment, but twice 
 
† Associate Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., magna cum laude, 
2015, St. John’s University School of Law. I would like to thank the many attorneys 
who have mentored me throughout law school, including my mother, Diana Prevete, 
my uncle, John Cozzi, and my Faculty Advisor for this Note, Vice Dean Emeritus 
Andrew Simons.  
1 The facts from this hypothetical are adapted, in part, from In re Avandia 
Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 685 F.3d 353, 355 (3d Cir. 2012). 
2 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii) (West 2014). 
3 See id. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(i). 
4 See id. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
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that amount.5  Thus, if Medicare makes a $50,000 conditional 
payment, the government may potentially recover $100,000 from 
GSK.  The government has this right regardless of whether there 
is a judgment against GSK or a settlement between GSK and 
Mrs. Aidan.6 
In an effort to stem the rising costs of health insurance, the 
MSP Act conditioned the government’s payments for Medicare 
enrollees upon repayment from private insurers.7  The 
government’s right of recovery is extensive; the Act allows the 
government to recover double the amount of damages calculated 
for the beneficiary.8  Amendments expanded the right even 
further, permitting the government to recover from alleged 
tortfeasors, such as GSK in the hypothetical.9  Imagine if the 
government’s rights, described in Mrs. Aidan’s case, were also 
available to Medicare Advantage Organizations (“MAOs”).  
Established under the Medicare Act, MAOs are private insurers 
that cover an additional thirteen million beneficiaries in the 
United States.10  For every one of these thirteen million 
beneficiaries who suffers an injury requiring medical costs, the 
MAO would have the ability to sue primary payers—including 
product-producing corporations—for double damages.11  The costs 
would severely affect corporations’ willingness to settle with 
injured beneficiaries. 
This Note proposes that the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the MSP Act, extending a 
private cause of action to private insurers, will have negative 
effects on mass tort litigation.  The Medicare statute’s text and 
 
5 See id. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii). 
6 See id. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii) (“A primary plan’s responsibility for such payment 
may be demonstrated by a judgment, a payment conditioned upon the recipient’s 
compromise, waiver, or release (whether or not there is a determination or 
admission of liability) of payment . . . included in a claim against the primary 
plan . . . .”). 
7 See id. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(i). 
8 See id. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii). 
9 See id. § 1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii); see also infra Part I.C.2. 
10 Marsha Gold et al., Medicare Advantage 2012 Data Spotlight: Enrollment 
Market Update, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 1 (2012), https://kaiserfamilyfound 
ation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8323.pdf. 
11 See § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii); Amaris Elliott-Engel, Cert Denial in Subrogation 
Case Could Complicate Mass Torts, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 16, 2013, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/pa/PubArticlePA.jsp?id=1202596050820, available at 
http://www.advance.lexis.com (search “Cert Denial in Subrogation Case”; then scroll 
down and select “Legal News” hyperlink). 
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legislative history do not definitively answer who should benefit 
from the private cause of action.  However, since the liable 
parties may be held responsible for payment even after settling 
with the plaintiffs, the potential of having to pay double damages 
will discourage such parties from settling.  Ultimately, the 
insured parties will have less compensation for their injuries. 
Part I of this Note outlines the history and purpose of the 
Medicare statute, Medicare Advantage, and the MSP Act.  The 
MSP Act dictates that insured individuals pursue coverage from 
“primary plans” while Medicare makes conditional payments 
with the agreement that the primary plans will reimburse the 
costs.12  Part II provides the MSP Act’s spectrum of 
interpretations and why the United States Circuit Courts of 
Appeals have read the private cause of action with varying 
expansiveness.  Part III concludes that the private cause of 
action should not be extended to MAOs, asserting that the 
extension ultimately results in harm to the injured insured and 
inefficiency in mass tort litigation and settlement.  Despite the 
worthy goal of reducing the cost of healthcare coverage, providing 
private insurers with a new federal remedy and entitlement to 
double damages is an undesirable and inefficient solution. 
I. HISTORY AND PURPOSE 
A. History and Purpose of the Medicare Statute 
Medicare is a federally conducted and federally funded 
health insurance program available to individuals age sixty-five 
and over, individuals who are permanently disabled under the 
Social Security Act, and individuals with end-stage renal 
disease.13  While the push for a government solution to 
healthcare began decades earlier, Medicare was born from the 
ideal of social insurance during President Franklin Delano  
 
 
 
 
12 § 1395y(b)(2)(A). 
13 Woody R. Clermont, A Brief Introduction to Medicare and the Office of 
Medicare Hearings and Appeals, 5 PITT. J. ENVTL. PUB. HEALTH L. 103, 103 (2011) 
(citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395rr (West 2014); 42 C.F.R. § 441.40 (2015)). 
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Roosevelt’s New Deal.14  In 1965, President Johnson signed the 
Social Security Amendments creating Medicare.15  The program 
focused on providing benefits for the elderly.16 
The Medicare Act consists of several parts.  Part A refers to 
the hospital insurance program, covering “inpatient hospital 
care, skilled-nursing facility care, hospice care and home health 
care.”17  Part B is the supplementary medical insurance program, 
which includes physician services,18 outpatient rehabilitation and 
hospital diagnostic services, outpatient physical therapy, 
occupational therapy, and speech pathology, among others.19  
Part C refers to a beneficiary’s choice of Medicare benefits 
through Medicare Advantage (“MA”) plans.20  Part D provides a 
voluntary prescription drug benefit program for enrollees in Part 
A, Part B, and MA.21  Over time, the Act has been amended to 
accommodate growing costs and the need for coverage for 
prescription drugs.22  The statute’s complicated nature continues 
to pose problems of statutory interpretation and efficiency.23 
B. The Creation of Medicare Advantage Organizations 
In 1997, Part C allowed for the creation of health plans 
covered by private insurers, shifting costs away from the 
government.24  Originally known as Medicare+Choice, the 
program was renamed Medicare Advantage in 2003.25  Under 
Part C, private insurers may establish “MAOs” that provide 
 
14 Rick Swedloff, Can’t Settle, Can’t Sue: How Congress Stole Tort Remedies 
from Medicare Beneficiaries, 41 AKRON L. REV. 557, 565–66 (2008). 
15 Clermont, supra note 13, at 104. 
16 Swedloff, supra note 14, at 570. 
17 Clermont, supra note 13, at 109 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395d (2012)). Part A also 
provides some coverage for other areas, such as up to ninety days of hospital care 
per illness occurrence, skilled nursing-facility care, home health care services, and 
hospice care. Id. at 109–10 (citations omitted). 
18 Id. at 112. 
19 Id. at 111–12. 
20 Id. at 113. 
21 Id. at 114. 
22 Swedloff, supra note 14, at 570–71. 
23 See In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 685 F.3d 353, 
365 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he Medicare Act has been described as among ‘the most 
completely impenetrable texts within human experience.’ ”) (quoting Cooper Univ. 
Hosp. v. Sebelius, 636 F.3d 44, 45 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
24 Clermont, supra note 13, at 105. 
25 Id. at 113. 
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Medicare beneficiaries with an alternative method of coverage.26  
Beneficiaries enrolling in one of these programs will receive the 
same benefits under Parts A and B, but the MA alternative 
avoids placing additional costs upon Medicare.27 
MA plans exist under a contract or policy arrangement and 
must comply with both state and federal requirements.28  
Medicare pays the MA plan per registered individual, but if 
healthcare costs exceed the annual funds, the MA plan bears the 
loss.29  If the MA plan’s overall cost of providing coverage to its 
members is less than the annual funds Medicare provides, the 
MA plan may keep those profits.30  Although there are various 
types of MA organizations, all MA plans must provide enrollees 
with coverage that encompasses the services guaranteed under 
the original Medicare program.31  As of March 2012, thirteen 
million beneficiaries were enrolled in MA plans, comprising  
twenty-seven percent of the Medicare population.32  These figures 
present a ten percent increase from the preceding year.33 
For the purposes of this Note, the most crucial difference 
between Medicare and Medicare Advantage emerges from the 
Medicare Secondary Payer Act.  While each plan option allows 
for certain benefits and payment schemes for its respective 
enrollees, the MSP Act affects recovery and reimbursement in 
lawsuits.34  Damages from a potential lawsuit may not be a 
primary concern for beneficiaries at the time of selecting 
enrollment; however, the various circuit courts’ interpretations of 
the MSP Act raises questions for an injured insured’s settlement 
abilities. 
 
26 Two Federal Courts Say MA Plans Can’t Use MSP Act To Recover Proceeds, 
COORDINATION BENEFITS HANDBOOK NEWSL. (Thompson Publ’g Grp., Inc.), Oct. 
2011 [hereinafter MA Plans Can’t Use MSP Act To Recover Proceeds]. 
27 Id. 
28 Clermont, supra note 13, at 113. 
29 MA Plans Can’t Use MSP Act To Recover Proceeds, supra note 26. 
30 Id. 
31 Clermont, supra note 13, at 113–14. MA plans do not have to provide hospice 
services but must offer a type of prescription drug plan available under Part D and 
may offer supplemental benefits. Id. at 114. 
32 Gold et al., supra note 10. 
33 Id. 
34 See Swedloff, supra note 14, at 560–61. 
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C. The Medicare Secondary Payer Act 
1. Medicare as a Secondary Payer 
Congress created the MSP Act as one potential solution to 
reduce some of Medicare’s growing costs.35  In 1980, the creation 
of the MSP Act shifted Medicare’s liability for providing primary 
coverage to enrollees.36  Before, Medicare served as the primary 
payer, or the payer of first resort, for injured enrollees.37  Now, 
under the MSP Act, private sources of primary coverage—such as 
workers’ compensation, automobile insurers, liability insurers, 
and no-fault insurers—cover a Medicare beneficiary’s claims.38  
Thus Medicare, as a secondary payer, makes payments for the 
beneficiary conditioned on reimbursement from the liable third 
party’s insurance provider.39  Congress intended to reduce its 
Medicare expenditures by shifting the cost of its enrollees from 
the publicly funded Medicare program to these private payers.40 
To be successful, the MSP Act requires a governmental 
method of enforcement.  Consequently, after Medicare makes 
conditional payments, the Act empowers the government to bring 
a direct action against the primary payer or any person or entity 
that has received payments from the primary insurer.41  
Medicare’s right of reimbursement is both immediate and 
expansive.  A case’s resolution encompasses settlement, 
judgment, or award; thus, any of these conclusions to a claim 
automatically triggers Medicare’s right to reimbursement.42  
 
35 Matthew Garretson, Medicare Liens—The Basics of the Medicare Secondary 
Provider (MSP) Statute, in HANDLING MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT CASES 2D § 6B:2 
(John W. Chandler ed., 2015). Risings costs are attributable to the “volume of 
services” provided to enrollees as the services steadily increased in complexity and 
intensity from 1965 and onwards. Swedloff, supra note 14, at 572–73 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
36 Swedloff, supra note 14, at 574. 
37 Id. 
38 Id.; see also 42 C.F.R. § 411.24 (2015). 
39 Garretson, supra note 35. 
40 Swedloff, supra note 14, at 575. 
41 Garretson, supra note 35. If there is a settlement, the government can seek 
recovery from the settling beneficiary, the attorneys that receive contingency 
payments from the settlement, and the settling defendant. Swedloff, supra note 14, 
at 586. 
42 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii) (West 2014) (“A primary plan’s 
responsibility . . . may be demonstrated by a judgment, a payment conditioned upon 
the recipient’s compromise, waiver, or release (whether or not there is a 
determination or admission of liability) . . . .”); see also Adam Stirrup, 
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Furthermore, the statute permits the government to recover 
double the amount of damages from the primary insurer that 
fails to reimburse Medicare.43 
2. Expansion of Primary Payers 
The 2003 amendment to the MSP Act expanded the 
government’s potential sources for revenue in an unprecedented 
fashion.44  From the outset of the Act, the government could 
recover from those entities that are clearly within the insurance 
industry.45  However, an ambiguity arose concerning the statute’s 
term “primary plan.”46  Prior to 2003, the government engaged in 
a series of lawsuits to recover from alleged tortfeasors, such as 
large corporations, that had settled with Medicare beneficiaries.47  
The government asserted its theory that the defendants were 
“self-insured entities” under the MSP Act.48 
In one of these lawsuits, Mason v. American Tobacco Co.,49 
Medicare recipients asserted a right to recover from defendant 
companies that manufactured products causing tobacco-related 
illnesses.50  The plaintiffs argued that under the statute, 
“defendants should have been the primary payers for the health 
care services needed to treat certain tobacco-related illnesses of 
Medicare beneficiaries.”51  As an issue of statutory interpretation, 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed whether the 
tobacco companies could be considered “self-insured,” “primary” 
plans under 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A) because, in corporate 
form, these companies carried their own risk and shifted liability 
to the corporations themselves.52  The court rejected this 
 
Understanding the Medicare Secondary Payer Act, MONDAQ, http://www.mondaq.co 
m/unitedstates/x/162988/Healthcare+Food+Drugs+Law/Understanding+The+Medica
re+Secondary+Payer+Act (last updated Feb. 1, 2012). 
43 See Swedloff, supra note 14, at 578; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(2)(A), 
1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii). 
44 Swedloff, supra note 14, at 579–80. 
45 Id. at 578. 
46 Id. 
47 See, e.g., Mason v. Am. Tobacco Co., 346 F.3d 36, 43 (2d Cir. 2003); United 
States v. Phillip Morris Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 145–46 (D.D.C. 2000); Thompson 
v. Goetzmann, 337 F.3d 489, 492 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). 
48 Swedloff, supra note 14, at 580. 
49 346 F.3d 36. 
50 Id. at 37–38. 
51 Id. at 38 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
52 Id. at 39–40 (internal quotation marks omitted); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(2)(A) 
(West 2014). 
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argument, claiming, “The obvious problem with this approach is 
that it turns every corporation into an insurance company subject 
to suit under the MSP statute.”53  Thus, the government failed in 
its attempts to pursue corporate tortfeasors as primary payers.54 
In direct response to the government’s failed litigation, 
Congress passed the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, 
and Modernization Act of 2003.55  The Medicare Reform Act 
within the amendment overturned the courts’ decisions and 
allowed Medicare to recover from alleged tortfeasors.56  The 
amendment provides: 
[T]he term “primary plan” means . . . a workmen’s compensation 
law or plan, an automobile or liability insurance policy or plan 
(including a self-insured plan) or no fault insurance, to the 
extent that clause (ii) applies.  An entity that engages in a 
business, trade, or profession shall be deemed to have a self-
insured plan if it carries its own risk (whether by a failure to 
obtain insurance, or otherwise) in whole or in part.57 
Thus, large corporations became considered “self-insured 
plans” and subject to primary payer responsibilities under the 
statute.58  In a settlement of a tort action, when a beneficiary 
agrees to compromise, waive, or release any claims against the 
defendant tortfeasor, the defendant assumes responsibility for 
any conditional payments.59  In mass tort cases, especially those 
involving product liability, the expanded definition of  
“self-insured plan” creates a host of new primary payers who may 
also be subject to the government’s right to recover double 
damages.60 
 
53 Mason, 346 F.3d at 40. The District Court for the District of Columbia also 
firmly rejected the government’s position: “[I]t is clear that Congress did not intend 
MSP to be used as an across-the-board procedural vehicle for suing tortfeasors, 
which is precisely how the Government attempts to use the statute in this case.” 
United States v. Phillip Morris Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135. 
54 See, e.g., Mason, 346 F.3d at 43. 
55 Garretson, supra note 35. 
56 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii); Garretson, supra note 35. 
57 § 1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). 
58 Garretson, supra note 35. 
59 Swedloff, supra note 14, at 584 (“It is hard to imagine a settlement agreement 
that would not include such a waiver and release of claims.”). The government may 
recover double damages from these primary payers when they fail to reimburse 
Medicare within sixty days, regardless of whether the defendant has already 
reimbursed the beneficiary. See id. at 585; 42 C.F.R. § 411.24(h) (2015). 
60 See 42 U.S.C.A § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii). 
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3. The Private Cause of Action Under 
42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(3)(A) 
In 1986, Congress added a “private cause of action” to assist 
recovery from insurers under the MSP Act.61  The text provides:  
“There is established a private cause of action for damages 
(which shall be in an amount double the amount otherwise 
provided) in the case of a primary plan which fails to provide for 
primary payment (or appropriate reimbursement) . . . .”62  
Cognizant of Congress’s concern with Medicare costs, some courts 
suggest that the private right of action allows the  
beneficiaries—who may be more aware than the government as 
to what entity is responsible as a primary payer—to use the 
threat of double damages to motivate a “recalcitrant insurer” to 
reimburse Medicare expenses.63  Furthermore, an award of 
double damages allows the beneficiary to not only pay back the 
government, but also to retain a personal “reward . . . for his 
efforts.”64  Accordingly, a beneficiary may exercise the same 
recovery rights as the government if the insurer fails to pay.65  
Thus, the private parties help enforce Medicare’s rights to 
recover from conditional payments by pursuing the money owed 
from the primary payers themselves.66 
Because of the 2003 amendment, beneficiaries may pursue a 
cause of action under the MSP Act in addition to any state law 
tort claims.67  Therefore, entities face twice the exposure for 
liability.68  Under the MSP Act, the right to recover exists when a 
claim is resolved through settlement, judgment, or award,69 
meaning that alleged tortfeasors may be liable for double 
damages without ever going to trial.70  Although beneficiaries 
 
61 Richard Neuworth & Kevin I. Goldberg, The MSP Act’s Hidden Remedy, 
TRIAL, Aug. 2009, at 38, 38. 
62 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(3)(A); see id. §§ 1395y(b)(1), 1395y(b)(2)(A) (referring 
to the provisions establishing Medicare as a secondary payer). 
63 Stalley v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 509 F.3d 517, 524–25 (8th Cir. 2007). 
64 Id. at 525. 
65 Id. at 523–25. The beneficiary may exercise this right whether the 
government has paid or not. Id. at 525. 
66 Neuworth & Goldberg, supra note 61 (citing Stalley, 509 F.3d at 524–25). 
67 Id. at 39. 
68 Id. at 39–40. 
69 See supra Part I.C.1. 
70 Neuworth & Goldberg, supra note 61, at 39–40. “The MSP creates a 
disincentive to settle because a defendant is automatically liable if it settles—that is, 
it has no defense to the Secretary’s claim for reimbursement . . . .” Swedloff, supra 
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may ultimately succeed in recovering from tortfeasors, 
defendants “must be concerned about the outcome of each of the 
individual cases in a mass tort, both in terms of actual precedent 
and creating a norm for settlement.”71  If defendants know that 
they will be facing multiple claims, regardless of whether or not 
they settle, then they will be less likely to settle in hopes of being 
able to limit liability at trial.72 
Recovery of Medicare payments from private insurers has 
expanded drastically.  Today, liability extends to almost any 
public and private entity that negligently causes injuries 
incurring medical expenses.73  Courts have accepted this recovery 
method for Medicare payments as applied to the government and 
Medicare beneficiaries.  However, before 2012, no circuit 
accepted a further application to private insurer MAOs.  With 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s 
decision in In re Avandia Marketing, Sales Practices & Products 
Liability Litigation,74 courts and alleged tortfeasors face 
extensive and additional claims for double damages from both 
MAOs and their enrollees. 
II. THE CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PRIVATE RIGHT 
OF ACTION, 42 U.S.C. § 1395Y(B)(3)(A) 
A. The Narrowest View:  Only Medicare May Bring Suit Against 
Tortfeasors 
Looking at the MSP Act’s private cause of action in 
conjunction with the 2003 amendment, the Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit has concluded that only Medicare has a federal 
cause of action against tortfeasors.75  In two particular cases, 
 
note 14, at 606. Similarly, alleged tortfeasors would have no defense to any parties 
exercising the private right of action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(3)(A) (West 2014). 
71 Swedloff, supra note 14, at 597–98. 
72 Id. at 598. Judge Weinstein observed: “Settlement of mass tort litigations for 
personal injuries have [sic] become extraordinarily complex and difficult as a result 
of the attempts by the United States to collect on Medicare liens . . . .” Id. (quoting In 
re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 451 F. Supp. 2d 458, 461 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)) (internal 
quotation mark omitted). 
73 Neuworth & Goldberg, supra note 61, at 40. 
74 685 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2012). 
75 See Bio-Med. Applications of Tenn., Inc. v. Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas 
Health & Welfare Fund, 656 F.3d 277, 294 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 
1087 (2012); Care Choices HMO v. Engstrom, 330 F.3d 786, 791 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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Care Choices HMO v. Engstrom76 and Bio-Medical Applications of 
Tennessee v. Central States Southeast & Southwest Areas Health 
& Welfare Fund,77 the court looked to the legislative history 
surrounding the various provisions in question.  While these 
cases did not involve suits by MAOs, the Sixth Circuit rejected a 
private party’s right to sue putative tortfeasors for double 
damages.78 
Prior to MA’s creation, in Care Choices HMO, the Sixth 
Circuit addressed some of the issues surrounding the private 
cause of action.  The plaintiff, Care Choices HMO, sued to 
recover medical expenses it had paid under the relevant 
statutory provision.79  Prior to Medicare Part C, Medicare 
“Health Maintenance Organizations” (“HMOs”) contracted with 
the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Service (“CMS”) to provide 
Medicare services on a “risk” or “cost” basis.80  Licensed by the 
CMS to provide replacement Medicare coverage, Care Choices 
claimed that its authorizing statute provided an implied private 
right of action; therefore, Care Choices could sue and recover 
health care expenses after the defendant’s liability carrier paid a 
settlement award for a slip-and-fall incident in the defendant’s 
supermarket.81 
Care Choices looked to the HMO “right to charge provision,” 
42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(e)(4), which by its plain language 
establishes an HMO’s right to reimbursement where a 
beneficiary is eligible for coverage under another insurance 
policy.82  However, the court had to determine if the statute 
created an affirmative statutory right, enforceable in federal 
court.83  The statute provides:  “Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, the eligible organization may . . . charge or 
 
76 330 F.3d at 789. 
77 656 F.3d at 289–90. 
78 Bio-Medical, 656 F.3d at 292–93; Care Choices HMO, 330 F.3d at 790. 
79 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395mm(e)(4) (West 2014); Care Choices HMO, 330 F.3d at 
787–88. 
80 D. Gary Reed, Medicare Advantage Preempts New York Anti-Subrogation 
Law, Three New Decisions Hold, HEALTH LAW., Aug. 2013, at 20, 21 (2013). 
81 Care Choices HMO, 330 F.3d at 787–88. 
82 Id. at 789; see also Eileen Kuo, Medicare Advantage as Secondary Payer: 
Efforts by MAOs To Seek Reimbursement Under the Medicare Secondary Payer 
Law—Private Cause of Action—Confusion Between the Old and the New with 
Medicare and Managed Care, in HEALTH L. HANDBOOK § 12:5 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 
2013). 
83 Id. 
FINAL_PREVETE 10/7/2015 7:12 PM 
246 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:235   
authorize the provider of such services to charge” either the 
“insurance carrier, employer, or other entity” legally obligated to 
pay for the services or its member, if the member had already 
been reimbursed for the services.84  In its analysis, the court 
looked to legislative history as well as comparisons with the MSP 
Act.85 
The court contrasted this HMO “right to charge” provision 
with the mandatory language of the MSP Act, which conditioned 
Medicare payments on reimbursement from a primary payer.86  
Upon comparing the MSP Act’s language—“ ‘shall’ be 
conditioned”—with the permissive word “may” found in the HMO 
provision, the court held that HMOs did not have as extensive 
rights as Medicare.87  The court reasoned that the MSP provision 
applied strictly to Medicare while Congress intentionally failed to 
provide an express remedy for HMOs in § 1395mm.88  The court 
emphasized that § 1395y(b) governs Medicare as a secondary 
payer, not any other insurer providing substitute Medicare 
coverage.89 
The court went beyond the text to distinguish the two 
statutes based on the MSP Act’s legislative history and policy.  
Specifically, there is a traditional, alternative method of recovery 
for Medicare-substitutes: contractual remedies in state court.90  
According to this interpretation, private insurers have the ability 
to include specific provisions within their policy plans.91  If 
private insurers, including HMOs and other MA plans, desire 
subrogation rights and the ability to pursue reimbursements in 
court, then they should include such a provision within their 
insurance policies.92  The court claimed that this remedy, “based 
on a standard insurance contract claim and not on any federal 
statutory right,” was a “widely recognized alternative avenue for 
 
84 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395mm(e)(4). 
85 Care Choices HMO, 330 F.3d at 789–90. 
86 Id. at 790; see also Kuo, supra note 82. 
87 Care Choices HMO, 330 F.3d at 790 (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(i); id. § 1395mm(e)(4). 
88 Care Choices HMO, 330 F.3d at 790. 
89 Id. at 789–90 (noting that § 1395mm(e)(4) did not provide Medicare-
substitute HMOs with “affirmative rights to reimbursement” while “Congress 
subsequently amended § 1395y to include an express right of recovery”). 
90 See id. at 790; Kuo, supra note 82. 
91 Care Choices HMO, 330 F.3d at 789; Reed, supra note 80, at 22. 
92 Care Choices HMO, 330 F.3d at 790; Reed, supra note 80, at 22. 
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enforcement.”93  With this reasonable alternative for insurers to 
recover, the court saw no reason to infer that private insurers 
possessed a federal right to sue.94 
In a later decision, the Sixth Circuit examined whether the 
2003 amendment classifying putative tortfeasors as primary 
payers would also allow a private party to recover double 
damages from defendant tortfeasors under the MSP Act’s private 
cause of action.95  In Bio-Medical, the plaintiff Bio-Medical, a 
specialized treatment center, provided kidney dialysis treatment 
to a patient for about one year.96  The patient assigned her rights 
under her insurance plan from Central States to Bio-Medical.97  
Central States initially covered the costs of the insured patient’s 
treatment; however, the coverage ceased after the patient was 
diagnosed with end-stage renal disease.98  Bio-Medical sought 
reimbursement under the MSP Act’s private cause of action, 
alleging that Central States—as a primary plan—failed to make 
payments after the patient’s diagnosis of end-stage renal disease, 
which made her eligible for Medicare benefits.99 
Central States attempted to avoid liability under the 2003 
amendment involving suits against tortfeasors under the private 
cause of action.100  With the 2003 amendment, Congress also 
added the “demonstrated responsibility” provision, which 
provides that a primary plan shall reimburse Medicare “if it is  
 
 
 
93 Care Choices HMO, 330 F.3d at 790. 
94 Id.  Other courts have applied this holding to contemporary MAOs. In a New 
York case, the court found that MAOs did not have a “statutory right of 
reimbursement” but only “ ‘statutory permission’ to include recovery provisions in 
their contracts.” See Kuo, supra note 82 (citing Ferlazzo v. 18th Ave. Hardware, Inc., 
33 Misc. 3d 421, 426, 929 N.Y.S.2d 690, 693–94 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. 2011)). 
95 Bio-Med. Applications of Tenn., Inc. v. Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & 
Welfare Fund, 656 F.3d 277, 279 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1087 
(2012). 
96 Id. at 280. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. End-stage renal disease is one of the conditions leading to Medicare 
coverage. See Clermont, supra note 13; 42 U.S.C. § 426-1(a)(2) (2012), 
42 U.S.C.A. § 1395rr(a) (West 2014). The patient’s insurance plan with Central 
States explicitly provided that coverage would cease upon entitlement to Medicare. 
Bio-Medical, 656 F.3d at 280. 
99 Id. at 285. By the time the patient died, Bio-Medical had an outstanding 
balance of approximately $210,000 and had received an undisclosed amount from 
Medicare. Id. at 280. 
100 Id. at 290. 
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demonstrated that such primary plan has or had a responsibility 
to make payment with respect to such item or service.”101  It 
further provides: 
A primary plan’s responsibility for such payment may be 
demonstrated by a judgment, a payment conditioned upon the 
recipient’s compromise, waiver, or release (whether or not there 
is a determination or admission of liability) of payment for 
items or services included in a claim against the primary plan 
or the primary plan’s insured, or by other means.102 
Although Central States attempted to avoid liability under 
this provision, the court noted several issues raised by prior case 
law:  (1) The demonstrated responsibility provision, several 
paragraphs away from the private cause of action provision, had 
been read to limit the private cause of action despite the lack of 
any cross-reference, and (2) the provision only explicitly 
addresses Medicare, not private parties.103 
Based on context and congressional intent, the court found 
that the demonstrated responsibility provision limited only 
tortfeasor liability, not primary plan liability generally.104  
Furthermore, the provision referred solely to Medicare; thus, the 
court found that the demonstrated responsibility provision 
applied only to suits brought by Medicare.105  Consequently, the 
demonstrated responsibility provision did not apply to Bio-
Medical, a private party, against Central States, an entity that 
provided insurance coverage but was not a self-insured 
tortfeasor.106  The court “believe[d] that when Congress amended 
the Act in 2003 to permit lawsuits against tortfeasors and to add 
the ‘demonstrated responsibility’ provision, Congress intended to 
permit lawsuits against tortfeasors only by Medicare, and not 
lawsuits against tortfeasors by private parties.”107  Thus, if a 
private party attempted to bring suit against a putative 
tortfeasor, the case would be dismissed. 
 
101 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii) (West 2014); see Bio-Medical, 656 F.3d at 
290. 
102 § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
103 Bio-Medical, 656 F.3d at 288 (discussing Glover v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 459 
F.3d 1304, 1308–09 (11th Cir. 2006)). 
104 Id. at 290. 
105 Id. at 292. 
106 Id. at 293. 
107 Id. at 292–93. 
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In Bio-Medical, the court deferred to the Act’s structure, 
noting that Congress placed the “demonstrated responsibility” 
provision within a subparagraph governing the relationship 
between Medicare and primary plans.108  Consequently, the 
reimbursement rights relating to tortfeasor liability did not apply 
to private parties.109  Furthermore, the legislative history 
surrounding the 2003 amendment did not suggest that the right 
of action against tortfeasors was available to private parties.110  
First, the MSP Act’s private cause of action does not require 
private parties to obtain a judgment before seeking 
reimbursement for Medicare’s conditionally made payments.111  
Second, Congress enacted the 2003 amendment in direct 
response to the cases that denied the government’s recovery 
against putative tortfeasors.112  These cases did not involve such 
a large extension of recovery rights to private parties.113 
Although Care Choices HMO and Bio-Medical did not involve 
suits brought by MAOs, the Sixth Circuit’s statements regarding 
the private cause of action and the demonstrated responsibility 
provision have implications upon how Congress intended the 
MSP Act to be applied to Medicare compared to other parties.  
While the Sixth Circuit strictly construed the statutory text, the 
court also relied on the legislative history surrounding the MSP 
Act and the 2003 amendment.114  When the court examined the 
textual, legislative, and policy factors working against extending 
the right to sue tortfeasors, it ultimately concluded that only 
Medicare had the right to bring suit. 
 
 
108 Id. at 292 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
109 Id. at 290–92. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 292; see also supra Part I.C.1. 
112 See Mason v. Sebelius, Civ. No. 11-2370 (JBS/KMW), 2012 WL 1019131, at 
*7, *9 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2012); see also supra Part I.C.2. 
113 Bio-Medical, 656 F.3d at 292 (“[T]he predominant legislative backdrop was 
Medicare’s (not private parties’) failed attempts to bring lawsuits against 
tortfeasors.”). 
114 See Care Choices HMO v. Engstrom, 330 F.3d 786, 790–91 (6th Cir. 2003); 
Bio-Medical, 656 F.3d at 288–89. 
FINAL_PREVETE 10/7/2015 7:12 PM 
250 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:235   
B. The Middle View:  Medicare Beneficiaries May Sue 
Tortfeasors Under the MSP Act 
Within the last several years, various circuits have 
interpreted the MSP Act to provide a private right of action 
exclusively to Medicare enrollees.  In these cases, the plaintiffs 
were not injured beneficiaries but third-party advocates, which 
implicates arguments about standing and statutory 
interpretation.115  Although the private cause of action does not 
explicitly establish who may bring suit, the circuits did not find 
that the statute conferred an unlimited right to sue.116  In 2007, 
the Court of Appeals for the First and Eighth Circuits held that 
only Medicare beneficiaries were entitled to invoke the private 
right of action under the MSP Act.117  Both courts dismissed on 
the same grounds:  The MSP Act’s private right of action did not 
bestow any plaintiff with the right to sue solely on behalf of the 
government.118 
In United Seniors Ass’n v. Philip Morris USA,119 a nonprofit 
taxpayer advocacy group sued to force five tobacco companies to 
reimburse the Medicare program expenditures on medical 
treatment for beneficiaries with smoke-related illnesses.120  The 
group asserted the right to bring suit under the 
42 U.S.C § 1395y(b)(3)(a) private cause of action.121  However, the 
plaintiff advocacy group did not allege whether it was suing on 
behalf of any of its members or whether any of its members were 
Medicare beneficiaries treated for smoking-related illnesses.122  
The court found that United Seniors “suing in its capacity as a 
nonprofit taxpayer advocacy group to vindicate the fiscal 
integrity of the Medicare program”—rather than representing 
any particular Medicare beneficiary—“utterly fails to meet [the] 
standard” for Article III standing.123  The plaintiffs insisted that 
the MSP Act private right of action was a qui tam statute.124  Qui 
 
115 See United Seniors Ass’n v. Philip Morris USA, 500 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 
2007); Stalley v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 509 F.3d 517, 519 (8th Cir. 2007). 
116 United Seniors Ass’n, 500 F.3d at 25; Stalley, 509 F.3d at 522. 
117 United Seniors Ass’n, 500 F.3d at 23; Stalley, 509 F.3d at 519. 
118 United Seniors Ass’n, 500 F.3d at 26; Stalley, 509 F.3d at 527. 
119 500 F.3d 19. 
120 Id. at 22. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 23. 
124 Id. 
FINAL_PREVETE 10/7/2015 7:12 PM 
2015] DOUBLE DAMAGES OR NOTHING 251 
tam statutes allow private individuals to sue on behalf of the 
federal government in an effort to encourage private aid in 
discovering fraud and abuse.125  However, the court looked at the 
statutory language and rejected this interpretation.126  Thus, the 
MSP Act private cause of action was limited to Medicare 
beneficiaries for the purpose of helping the government recover 
its conditional payments. 
The court noted that although the legislative history is 
ambiguous, Congress added the private right of action to reduce 
government spending.127  An examination of the text and public 
policy convinced the court that this right to recover was limited 
to Medicare beneficiaries.128  The First Circuit contrasted 
42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(3)(A) with true qui tam statutes, such as the 
False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. § 3729.129  As a qui tam 
statute, the FCA explicitly authorizes that a “person may bring a 
civil action . . . for the person and for the United States” as 
opposed to the language of § 1395y(b)(3)(A), which merely 
establishes that a private cause of action exists.130  Also, 
Congress enacted the causes of action in the FCA and MSP Act 
within the same month; thus, Congress intentionally phrased 
these two provisions differently and intended to limit the MSP 
action.131 
The Eighth Circuit, like the First Circuit, concluded that the 
MSP Act provided a private right only for Medicare beneficiaries 
in association with recovering conditional Medicare payments.132  
As in United Seniors, the plaintiff in Stalley v. Catholic Health 
Initiatives133 had no personal injury but asserted he had standing 
to bring suit under the MSP Act’s private right of action as a qui 
 
125 Id. at 24. 
126 Id. at 25 (“[A]ssuming (as we do) that only Medicare beneficiaries can 
prosecute a private § 1395y(b)(3)(A) cause of action . . . their very power to sue 
coincidently serves a pro-government purpose: that of discouraging primary insurers 
from failing to reimburse Medicare and preventing depletion of the Medicare trust 
fund.”). 
127 Id. at 21. 
128 See id. at 25; Stalley v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 509 F.3d 517, 522 (8th 
Cir. 2007). 
129 United Seniors Ass’n, 500 F.3d at 24. 
130 Compare United Seniors Ass’n, 500 F.3d at 24 (alteration in original) 
(quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012)), with 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(3)(A) (West 2014) 
(“There is established a private cause of action for damages . . . .”). 
131 United Seniors Ass’n, 500 F.3d at 24. 
132 Stalley, 509 F.3d at 527. 
133 509 F.3d 517. 
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tam statute.134  Stalley alleged that defendants Catholic Health 
Initiatives and Triad Hospitals, Inc., who were partly  
self-insured for malpractice, caused harm to Medicare patients at 
their hospitals.135  Similar to United Seniors, the court noted that 
Stalley neither claimed to be a Medicare beneficiary nor did he 
allege any personal injury from defendants.136 
Relying on the statute’s plain language, the court noted that 
“[t]here is established a private cause of action for damages” as 
opposed to a public right, which may be vindicated in qui tam 
actions.137  Although the court acknowledged that the private 
right of action may share characteristics of a qui tam statute, it 
would not confer a qui tam right to sue based on Congress’s 
intentions.138  Faced with scant legislative history referring to the 
private right, the court looked to case law and found general 
agreement that the statute’s purpose is to aid the government’s 
recovery of conditional payments.139  Logically, if Congress 
contemplated that Medicare beneficiaries would sue to recover 
double damages from primary payers, then beneficiaries and 
Medicare would be adequately compensated.  Consequently, the 
statute should not be read to allow plaintiffs to sue in order to 
assert “the public’s rights.”140  Similar to the First Circuit, the 
Eighth Circuit in Stalley also referenced the FCA, which 
contained procedural safeguards for the government to control 
the qui tam provision.141  In contrast, the MSP Act had no such 
governmental controls, providing strong textual support and 
“powerful evidence that Congress did not mean § 1395y(b)(3)(A)  
 
 
 
 
134 Id. at 520. 
135 Id. at 519–20. Stalley pursued the medical care providers as self-insured 
primary payer tortfeasors and their insurers as primary payers. Id. 
136 Id. at 520. 
137 Id. at 522 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(3)(A) (West 2014)) (internal 
quotation mark omitted). 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 524 (citing United Seniors Ass’n v. Philip Morris USA, 500 F.3d 19, 21–
22 (1st Cir. 2007); Manning v. Utils. Mut. Ins. Co., 254 F.3d 387, 396–97 & n.8 (2d 
Cir. 2001); Harris Corp. v. Humana Health Ins. Co. of Fla., 253 F.3d 598, 606 (11th 
Cir. 2001); Frazer v. CNA Ins. Co., 374 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1077 (N.D. Ala. 2005)). 
140 Id. at 527. 
141 Id. at 522. 
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to function as a qui tam statute.”142  Therefore, the MSP Act 
private cause of action required private parties to assert their 
own injury.143 
In Stalley, the court also explored the practical implications 
of allowing beneficiaries to sue under the private cause of action:  
(1) The beneficiary may have greater awareness than the 
government of the entities responsible for payment; (2) the 
beneficiary has the incentive of recovering double damages from 
the primary payer and payment exceeding original expenses; and 
(3) the beneficiary obtains sufficient recovery to reimburse the 
government.144  Thus, when Medicare makes conditional 
payments, the private cause of action allows Medicare 
beneficiaries to recover double damages for themselves with the 
ability to repay the government.145  Both the statutes and case 
law support the limitation on the private cause of action to 
Medicare.  The courts engaged in extensive interpretation 
because the statutory text does not explicitly identify Medicare 
beneficiaries as private actors; it only establishes that a private 
cause of action exists under the Act.146  Legislative history also 
fails to clarify who the private actor may be.  Nonetheless, 
Congress enacted the private cause of action several years prior 
to the creation of MA programs.147  Based on these implicit 
textual cues as well as policy, the limitations upon the private 
right of action garner substantial support. 
Based on the courts’ limitation of the action, the MSP Act 
allows Medicare beneficiaries to sue to enforce Medicare’s 
rights.148  If plaintiffs meet the standing requirements, then they 
may sue their primary plan providers to recover Medicare’s 
conditional payments.149  With the specific purpose of reducing 
 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 524–25. 
145 Id. at 527. 
146 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(3)(A) (West 2014). 
147 Congress enacted the MSP Act in 1980 and added the private cause of action 
in 1986. See id. § 1395y(b)(3)(A). Congress created the Medicare Advantage program, 
then known as the Medicare+Choice program in 1997. See Balanced Budget Act of 
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251, 275-76 (1997). 
148 See Stalley, 509 F.3d at 522–23; United Seniors Ass’n v. Philip Morris USA, 
500 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2007). 
149 Tamela J. White, The Medicare Secondary Payer Act and Section 111 of the 
Medicare, Medicaid, Schip Extension Act of 2007: Implications for Claim 
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government spending, MSP claims are individualized and do not 
exist in “mass-tort scenarios.”150  In the hands of a beneficiary, 
the double damages recovery is a powerful tool, essentially 
“requir[ing] a payer to settle the same medical expense claim 
three times.”151  Consequently, specific beneficiaries do not bring 
a generalized grievance suit on behalf of a class of commonly 
injured Medicare beneficiaries.152  The express purpose of the 
private cause of action is to allow Medicare beneficiaries to help 
the government recover conditional Medicare payments.153 
C. The Broadest View:  The MSP Act Private Cause of Action 
Extends to MAOs 
While the circuits have debated how expansive the MSP 
Act’s private cause of action is regarding Medicare beneficiaries 
and putative tortfeasors, the courts have consistently examined 
the right in the context of Medicare’s conditional payments.  
However, in 2012 the Third Circuit became the first circuit to 
hold that the Medicare Secondary Payer Act places no limits on 
the private actor that can bring suit to recover double 
damages.154  Consequently, MAOs, as secondary payers, may sue 
primary payers who fail to reimburse MAOs for conditional 
payments.155 
The Third Circuit employed the broadest interpretation of 
the MSP Act after it consulted both the statutory text and CMS 
regulations.156  In In re Avandia Marketing, Sales Practices & 
Products Liability Litigation,157 the plaintiff Humana was an 
insurance company that ran a MA plan.158  As a private 
insurance company created under Medicare Part C, Humana 
sued the defendant GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) to recover expenses 
 
Management and Resolution for Liability Insurance Plans, 77 DEF. COUNS. J. 180, 
186 (2010). 
150 Id. at 186–87. 
151 Id. at 186. 
152 Id. at 186–87. Article III standing requirements must be met: “injury in fact, 
causal connection, and injury redress.” Id. 
153 Id. at 186. 
154 In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 685 F.3d 353, 365 
(3d Cir. 2012). 
155 Id. at 367. 
156 Id. at 355. 
157 685 F.3d 353. 
158 Id. at 355. 
FINAL_PREVETE 10/7/2015 7:12 PM 
2015] DOUBLE DAMAGES OR NOTHING 255 
incurred for Humana’s treatment of its insureds’ injuries.159  GSK 
manufactured and distributed the drug Avandia, which was used 
to treat Type 2 diabetes and had been linked to “substantially 
increased risk of heart attack and stroke.”160  As a MAO, Humana 
insured those enrollees who were injured by taking Avandia.161 
The Third Circuit agreed with Humana’s assertion that “the 
private cause of action . . . created by the Medicare Secondary 
Payer Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(3)(A), provides it and other 
MAOs with the right to bring suit.”162  The court noted that the 
provision establishing MAOs as secondary payers  
cross-referenced § 1395y(b)(2), which provides the definitions for 
primary payers and secondary payers with regard to the original 
Medicare program.163  Based on these definitions, GSK qualified 
as a “self-insured plan” because it paid “out of its own pocket to 
settle the Avandia-related claims.”164  Thus, GSK was a primary 
payer and Humana was a secondary payer.165  The MSP Act only 
provides the United States with a cause of action.166  However, 
the court then looked to the MSP Act private cause of action to 
determine that MAOs also have a cause of action against primary 
payers.167 
Remarkably, the Third Circuit looked at the same statutory 
text as its sister circuits and came to the opposite conclusion 
regarding the absence of an established plaintiff in the private 
cause of action under § 1395y(b)(3)(A).168  According to the court, 
if Congress wanted to limit the private cause of action and make 
it unavailable to MAOs then it would have expressly done so,169 
as in other provisions of the Medicare Act in which the section 
applied only to “part A or part B of this subchapter” and not part 
 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 357. 
163 Id. at 358. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii) (West 2014) (“[T]he United States may 
bring an action against any or all entities that are or were required or 
responsible . . . to make payment with respect to the same item or service (or any 
portion thereof) under a primary plan.”). 
167 In re Avandia, 685 F.3d at 358–59. 
168 Id. at 359. 
169 Id. at 359–60. 
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C.170  A plain reading of the statutory text—“[t]here is established 
a private cause of action”171—placed no limitation upon which 
private parties may bring suit.172  Thus, the court found any 
private party, including MAOs, had a right to sue for 
reimbursement from a primary plan.173  Although MAOs did not 
exist when Congress created the MSP Act, the court believed that 
since Congress was aware of the existence of other private 
Medicare providers, such as HMOs, Congress would have 
explicitly prevented them from suing under the private cause of 
action provision.174 
The court believed that the statutory text clearly conferred 
MAOs with the right to recover under the MSP Act.175  However, 
it also came to the same conclusion under the deference analysis 
articulated in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Counsil, Inc.176  The Chevron two-part test allows a federal court 
to determine whether or not it will defer to statutory 
interpretation found within a federal agency’s regulation when 
that agency is charged with implementing the statute in 
question.177  According to the test, (1) if congressional intent is 
clear, the court must abide by that intent regardless of any 
regulations, and (2) if the statute is unclear, “that is, silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” then the court will 
determine if the agency’s answer through regulations is a 
permissible interpretation.178 
Specifically, the court referred to CMS’s guidance on 
Medicare secondary payer procedures provided in the Code of 
Federal Regulations.179  Within 42 C.F.R. § 422.108, states are 
prohibited from depriving MA organizations of the rights 
 
170 Id. at 360 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(a)). 
171 § 1395y(b)(3)(A). 
172 In re Avandia, 685 F.3d at 359. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 360. The court was referring to private insurers such as the HMO seen 
in Care Choices HMO v. Engstrom, 330 F.3d 786 (6th Cir. 2003). See supra, Part 
II.A. 
175 In re Avandia, 685 F.3d at 360. 
176 Id. at 365–66. 
177 Id. at 366 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 
(Chevron), 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)). 
178 Id. (internal quotation mark omitted) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–44). 
The court defers to this permissible regulation as long as it is not “arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Id. (internal quotation mark 
omitted). 
179 See id.; 42 C.F.R. § 422.108 (2015). 
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available to them under “[f]ederal law and the MSP regulations 
to bill, or to authorize providers and suppliers to bill, for services 
for which Medicare is not the primary payer.”180  It further 
provides:  “The MA organization will exercise the same rights to 
recover from a primary plan, entity, or individual that the 
Secretary exercises under the MSP regulations in subparts B 
through D of part 411 of this chapter.”181  Thus, the court saw the 
regulation as a direct interpretation of the MSP Act and deferred 
to congressional intent to treat MAOs in the same manner as 
Medicare under the MSP Act.182 
The court also found that legislative history and policy 
supported its expansive interpretation of the private cause of 
action.183  The court referred to Congress’s expressed goal of 
curbing the rising costs of Medicare and how Congress intended 
to accomplish this goal through enacting the Medicare Advantage 
program and the MSP Act.184  MAOs’ ability to use the private 
market for innovation and cost reduction would be inhibited if 
they could not recover with the same persuasive means that 
Medicare employs, including the threat of double damages.185  
The Third Circuit followed a somewhat attenuated line of 
reasoning; when MA plans spend less and efficiently provide 
coverage to enrollees, the Medicare Trust Fund retains twenty-
five percent of the savings.186  Consequently, when MAOs recover 
from primary payers, they spend less on their enrollees and that 
results in cost savings to the Medicare Trust Fund.187  The court 
conceded that “the legislative history is nowhere explicit that 
MAOs may bring suit for double damages under the MSP private 
cause of action or using any other provision.”188  Regardless, 
 
180 § 422.108(f). 
181 Id. 
182 In re Avandia, 685 F.3d at 366–67. 
183 Id. at 363. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 363–64. 
186 Id. at 365. 
187 Id.; see also Eileen Kuo, Medicare Advantage as a Secondary Payer: Efforts by 
MAOs To Seek Reimbursement Under the Medicare Secondary Payer Law—Private 
Cause of Action—The Third Circuit Finds That MAOs Do Have a Private Cause of 
Action Against Primary Payers, in 2013 HEALTH L. HANDBOOK § 12:7 (Alice G. 
Gosfield ed., 2013) (“In other words, when MAOs are able to reduce costs by avoiding 
payment or collecting reimbursement when MAOs are secondary to a primary payer, 
the resulting savings do return to the Medicare Trust Fund and result in reduced 
costs for Medicare.”). 
188 In re Avandia, 685 F.3d at 364. 
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Congress intended to reduce the healthcare burden on the 
government through the creation of MAOs as a competitive 
alternative, and to place MAOs at a “competitive disadvantage” 
undermines that goal.189 
Those supporting an extension of the private right of action 
to MAOs are also concerned with the alleged alternative means 
for MAOs to recover conditional payments.  Because of the 
complexity of the Medicare Act, there is some debate as to how 
Medicare Part C plans interact with the federal government and 
enrollees.190   MAOs contract with the federal government to 
serve as a substitute for benefits provided under Medicare Parts 
A and B.191  Therefore, MAOs must comply with the statutory 
guidelines and do not issue their own policies or insurance 
contracts.192  As a result, these supporters argue that MAOs do 
not have the suggested alternative of writing in “subrogation” 
rights into their “insurance contracts.”193  Instead, MAOs’ rights 
to recovery as secondary payers are purely statutory.194 
This interpretation of the private cause of action hinges on 
the view that MAOs enjoy the same rights and privileges as the 
federal government.  It also employs a liberal approach to the 
methods that will ensure the ultimate goal of reducing the 
government’s costs for healthcare.  An expansion of recovery 
rights to MAOs does not have the textual and legislative support 
as the other interpretations of the private cause of action.  The 
lack of substantial support and the policy implications of 
expanding recovery rights counsel against this broad 
interpretation. 
III. THE PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER § 1395Y(B)(3)(A) 
SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED TO ALLOW MAOS TO SUE AND 
RECOVER DOUBLE DAMAGES 
Based on both the plain language of the MSP Act’s private 
cause of action in 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(3)(A) and policy 
implications, courts should not expand the right to sue and 
 
189 Id. at 363–64. 
190 MA Plans Can’t Use MSP Act To Recover Proceeds, supra note 26. 
191 Id.; Kuo, supra note 82. 
192 See MA Plans Can’t Use MSP Act To Recover Proceeds, supra note 26; Kuo, 
supra note 82. 
193 Kuo, supra note 82 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
194 Id. 
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recover double damages from primary payers when Congress did 
not extend this right.  The Third Circuit in In re Avandia created 
a new and extremely lucrative federal cause of action where none 
previously existed.195  Without sufficient support from the 
statutory text and legislative history, courts should refrain from 
allowing MAOs to assert these reimbursement rights until 
Congress provides clarification. 
A. Support from Case Law and Statutes for a Limitation on the 
Private Cause of Action 
Prior to the Third Circuit’s decision in In re Avandia, no 
circuit had expanded a federal right to pursue conditional 
payments to MAOs.  In fact, other circuits limited the private 
cause of action as applied to Medicare beneficiaries.196  The courts 
gave various reasons to limit recovery under the MSP Act.  
Although the statutory text can be ambiguous and confusing, 
Congress never explicitly expanded the MSP Act to MAOs.197  
Furthermore, when all relevant sections refer explicitly to the 
government, courts should not read in an application to MAOs 
when legislative history also does not suggest such an 
application. 
First, the text of the MSP Act establishes Medicare as a 
secondary payer, emphasizing the statute’s purpose at its most 
basic level: cost-savings and reimbursement for the federal 
government.198  Likewise, each following subparagraph identifies 
the federal government: providing the Secretary of CMS with the 
power to make a “conditional payment” under 
§ 1395y(b)(2)(B)(i),199 ensuring repayment to the Medicare “Trust 
Fund,” and providing a cause of action for the United States to 
recover these payments and collect double damages.200  Similarly, 
nothing within the provision establishing a private cause of 
 
195 See Elliott-Engel, supra note 11. 
196 Compare In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 685 F.3d 
353, 367 (3d Cir. 2012) (allowing MAOs to sue putative tortfeasors to recover 
conditional payments), with Bio-Med. Applications of Tenn., Inc. v. Cent. States Se. 
& Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund, 656 F.3d 277, 294 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. 
dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012) (concluding that only Medicare, and not Medicare 
beneficiaries could bring suit against putative tortfeasors under the MSP Act). 
197 In re Avandia, 685 F.3d at 360. 
198 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(i) (West 2014). 
199 Id. 
200 Id. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii), (iii). 
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action provides any reference to reimbursement outside of 
Medicare.201  Based upon textual analysis, courts have found that 
the private cause of action provides Medicare beneficiaries with 
the ability to sue and recover conditional payments, enforcing a 
pro-government scheme.202 
Reliance on regulations to confer a right to MAOs, which 
Congress itself has not provided, is inappropriate.  The Third 
Circuit cited a federal regulation, which provides:  “The MA 
organization will exercise the same rights to recover from a 
primary plan, entity, or individual that the Secretary exercises 
under the MSP regulations . . . .”203  However, federal regulations 
provide administrative guidance, and they cannot create a cause 
of action where none exists.204  As written, the statute leaves far 
too much doubt as to whether Congress intended to extend these 
powerful rights of recovery to private insurers that pursue their 
own money and not money paid from the Medicare Trust Fund. 
Legislative history and case law also support limiting the 
private cause of action.  Congress established the MSP Act’s 
private cause of action in 1986, before MAOs existed as a 
substitute form of health coverage, indicating that, at the time, 
Congress could have contemplated only the government’s 
recovery of conditional payments.205  Also, the First and Eighth 
Circuits have ruled that the private cause of action is not a qui 
tam statute conferring a public right to sue on behalf of the 
federal government.206  Instead, the courts limited the right to 
those with standing and an established injury from the 
nonforthcoming payments, rather than opening mass tort 
litigation to unrelated plaintiffs.207  The Sixth Circuit suggested a 
 
201 See id. § 1395y(b)(3)(A). 
202 See, e.g., United Seniors Ass’n v. Philip Morris USA, 500 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 
2007). 
203 42 C.F.R. § 422.108(f) (2015). 
204 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & 
Prods Liab. Litig., 685 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2012) (No. 12-690), 2012 WL 6054794, at 
*35 (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 257, 291 (2001) (“[A] regulation may not 
‘conjure up a private cause of action that has not been authorized by 
Congress . . . .’ ”)). 
205 Neuworth & Goldberg, supra note 61, at 38; see also Stalley v. Catholic 
Health Initiatives, 509 F.3d 517, 524–25 (8th Cir. 2007). MAOs were created in 
1997. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251, 275–76 
(1997). 
206 See generally United Seniors Ass’n v. Philip Morris USA, 500 F.3d 19 (1st 
Cir. 2007); Stalley, 509 F.3d at 517. 
207 See generally United Seniors Ass’n, 500 F.3d at 19; Stalley, 509 F.3d at 517. 
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further limitation based on primary payer liability, specifically 
for putative tortfeasors.208  The Sixth Circuit implied that the 
2003 amendment, expanding “primary payer” to include putative 
tortfeasors, came with two limitations: only Medicare could 
pursue tortfeasors under the MSP Act and only if it met the 
demonstrated responsibility provision.209  Notably, although 
there is conflict among the circuits as to the precise limitations 
placed upon the MSP Act private cause of action, the Third 
Circuit stands alone in its assertion that it extends to suits by 
MAOs. 
B. Support from Policy for Limiting the Private Cause of Action 
Despite any ambiguities in text or case law, public policy 
justifies limiting the private cause of action.  The costs within 
mass tort litigation discourage the broadest interpretation of the 
private cause of action.  Putative tortfeasors, liable as primary 
payers, face the threat of double damages.210  That threat directly 
bears on these defendants’ willingness to settle with an injured 
insured.  With little congressional intent to support the change, 
MAOs should resort to their traditional remedies in state courts. 
In the context of complex mass tort litigation, expanding the 
private right of action provides a right to sue for double damages 
to hundreds of MAOs insuring thousands of people.211  Under the 
MSP Act, these new plaintiffs have a federal tort remedy for 
personal injury actions, an area traditionally left to state 
courts.212  The expanded interpretation of the private cause of 
action allows private insurers to enter federal courts in an 
unprecedented manner.  The cause of action provides a potential 
windfall for private insurance companies because once an 
insurance company makes a conditional payment, it may proceed 
to recover this payment from a settling tortfeasor.213  There is a 
strong incentive to pursue double damages against corporate 
defendants that fail to timely reimburse MAOs.  Thus, the 
 
208 See generally Bio-Med. Applications of Tenn., Inc. v. Cent. States Se. & Sw. 
Areas Health & Welfare Fund, 656 F.3d 277 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. dismissed, 132 S. 
Ct. 1087 (2012). 
209 Id. at 292–93. 
210 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii) (West 2014). 
211 Elliott-Engel, supra note 11. 
212 Id.; see Care Choices HMO v. Engstrom, 330 F.3d 786, 791 n.7 (6th Cir. 
2003). 
213 Elliott-Engel, supra note 11. 
FINAL_PREVETE 10/7/2015 7:12 PM 
262 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:235   
private cause of action no longer promotes efficiency and 
government cost reduction; instead, it provides a method for 
private insurers to recover.  This interpretation does not serve 
the original purpose of the MSP Act.214 
In mass tort litigation, defendants must consider how 
settlement will affect the outcome of later litigation, and the 
MSP Act leads to even greater consequences.  Generally, settling 
a case for a large amount of money can create a norm for later 
plaintiffs who pursue the same defendant.215  Under the MSP 
Act, any large settlements may become the basis for a MAO’s 
right to recover in the future.216  Under the MSP Act, defendants 
who settle with beneficiaries are automatically liable as primary 
plans.217  Suddenly, defendants are facing the possibility of 
lawsuits from not only Medicare and Medicare beneficiaries but 
also MAOs and their beneficiaries.  These defendants must focus 
on the future costs of settlement and the current exposure to both 
governmental and private insurance entities that may potentially 
pursue double damages. 
Compounding the complications of expanded liability, 
settling tortfeasors face practical issues in their efforts to 
reimburse MAOs’ conditional payments.  In comparison to the 
data CMS provides on Medicare, the information pairing MAOs 
with their claimants is not readily available.218  Under the MSP 
Act, there is a sixty-day period for a primary plan to reimburse 
the conditional payer before the government may pursue the 
primary plan.219  Putative tortfeasors have no independent source 
matching MA enrollees with their private insurers.220  Thus, the 
settling defendant has limited ability to ensure timely 
reimbursement for a potentially unrevealed lien and risks 
exposure to double damages with every settlement.221 
Without Congress’s clarification, extending the private cause 
of action to MAOs creates a host of issues in exchange for few 
benefits.  Although the court in In re Avandia indicated the 
 
214 See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
215 Swedloff, supra note 14, at 597–98. 
216 See id. at 598 (discussing the problems of the MSP Act within the context of 
Medicare). 
217 Id. at 606. 
218 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 204, at *28–29. 
219 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii) (West 2014). 
220 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 204, at *28–29. 
221 Id. at *28–29. 
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eventual savings to Medicare that occur when MAOs recover 
their conditional payments efficiently,222 this minimal advantage 
does not outweigh the risks of expansion.  If Congress seeks to 
provide MAOs with a private right of action, it would be 
beneficial to also provide limitations.  Additionally, Congress 
should consider devising a method or database for defendants to 
match enrollees with their MAOs, preventing late 
reimbursement due to unknown liens.  The double damages 
recovery is a powerful tool, perhaps best used by the government 
alone.  Therefore, under the current state of the MSP Act, the 
private cause of action should not apply to MAOs. 
CONCLUSION 
The MSP Act private cause of action should be construed 
narrowly to exclude MAOs’ right to sue putative tortfeasors for 
recovery of conditional payments.  Congress enacted the MSP Act 
and the private cause of action with one ultimate goal: help the 
government recover conditional payments made on behalf of 
Medicare enrollees.  Allowing private insurer MAOs to assert the 
same rights as the government subverts the purpose of the 
statute, providing recovery to private insurers and not the 
government.  By finding a cause of action where Congress did not 
explicitly provide one, the Third Circuit decision has left parties 
with a looming threat to settlements in mass tort litigation.  As 
defendants face extensive and costly liability, the injured insured 
parties are ultimately left with less compensation while the 
government derives little of the statute’s intended benefits.  In 
the interest of preventing inefficiency in federal litigation, the 
private cause of action should not be extended to MAOs. 
 
 
222 In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 685 F.3d 353, 365 
(3d Cir. 2012). 
